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EDUCATION AND CONTRACEPTION MAKE
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: BROWN,
GRISWOLD, LOCHNER, AND THE PUTATIVE
DILEMMA OF LIBERALISM
Robert F. Schopp*
I. THE DILEMMA
Future historians may contend that the Supreme Court decisions in
Brown v. Board of Education' and Griswold v. Connecticut2 represent the
apex of liberal legal and political thought. Thirty-five years after Brown, how-
ever, the attempt to clarify and implement the jurisprudence of equal protection
represented by that case remains incomplete. Programs designed to effectuate
the equal protection mandate of Brown through methods such as busing, hiring
quotas or goals, preferential treatment, and affirmative action continue to incite
controversy. The Supreme Court's recent ruling in City of Richmond v.
Croson Co. 3 demonstrates that the justices remain deeply divided regarding the
appropriate role and scope of affirmative action programs involving race-based
classification or "reverse discrimination." 4
The long and difficult road toward practical implementation of Brown
and the jurisprudence of equal protection can be attributed to many factors.
These include the long history of segregation in the United States, the economic
and political costs of some remedies, and many realistic and unrealistic fears
associated with segregation and integration. It is reasonable to suggest,
however, that the Brown Court may have unwittingly contributed to this
extended controversy by failing to fully articulate a principled foundation for
its decision. Indeed, even Herbert Wechsler, who supports the Brown decision,
* Assistant Professor of Law and Psychology, the University of Nebraska College
of Law. I am grateful to Allen Buchanan, Keith Burgess-Jackson, and Robert J. Glennon for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See infra notes 16-21 & 77-80 for further discussion of
Brown.
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See infra notes 35-66 for further discussion of Griswold.
3. 488 U.S. _, 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989). See infra note 96 and accompanying text for
further discussion of Croson Co..
4. Id. Justice O'Connor wrote the Croson Co. majority opinion. Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, and Scalia concurred in the judgment, but differed with at least part of Justice
O'Connor's analysis. Justice Marshall wrote an extensive and emphatic dissent in which
Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined. At least three law reviews have recently wrestled with
the problem of affirmative action in symposia. See 21 GA. L. REV. 1007-67 (1987), 72 IOWA
L. REV. 255-85 (1987), and 26 WAYNE L REV. 1199-1411 (1980).
Schopp in Arizona Law Review (1990) 32. Copyright 1990, Arizona Law Review. Used by permission.
is troubled by the Court's failure to clearly ground its opinion in established
legal principles.5
Some critics of liberal legal and political thought would argue that the
Court did not provide a principled basis for the decision because it could not.
Such critics deny that liberalism stands on any consistent foundation of princi-
ple, and they view the series of cases from Brown through Croson Co. as evi-
dence of liberalism's inadequacy. Morton Horwitz,6 for example, argues that
Brown and Lochner v. New York 7 constitute two horns of a dilemma created
for liberals by their attitudes toward these two decisions. He claims that since
Lochner liberals have generally opposed active court review of social and
economic legislation as unjustified judicial activism that substitutes the judgment
of the court for that of the elected legislature. He contends that since Lochner
liberals have advocated judicial restraint and deference to the legislature. 8
Most liberals support Brown, however, even though the Brown Court
closely scrutinized and overturned state legislation regarding segregation in
public education. In Horwitz's view, liberals encounter their dilemma because
they oppose Lochner on the ground that courts should not actively review social
or economic legislation, while they support Brown in which the Court actively
reviewed and overturned social legislation. 9 Horwitz argues that liberals
encounter this problem because they attend primarily to individuals rather than
to social groups or classes, and because they accept equality of opportunity but
reject equality of condition as legitimate goals of government. He contends that
analysis focusing on the individual overlooks historical burdens and injustices
which create inequalities of condition. According to Horwitz, these inequalities
of condition preclude effective equality of opportunity. 10
Horwitz is not alone in alleging that liberals face a dilemma created by
Lochner on the one hand and more recent Supreme Court decisions on the
other. Justice Black's dissent in Griswold presents an analogous challenge.
Justice Black interpreted the Griswold majority opinion as a return to
Lochnerism because he understood the majority to be striking down social
legislation on the basis of appeal to personal preference and natural law."
While Brown troubles some commentators because it fails to provide a
thorough explanation of its constitutional basis, the Griswold opinion provides
an explanation in terms such as "penumbras," "emanations," and "zones of
privacy" that Justice Black objected to as foreign to the Constitution.12
Griswold, like Brown, has generated a series of cases in which the Court has
struggled to articulate the nature, source, and scope of the right identified in the
opinion. Most recently, Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Webster v.
5. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1959). See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for an account of Wechsler's concerns.
6. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 599 (1979).
7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court invalidated regulations restricting bakers to sixty-
hour work weeks in a decision sometimes thought of as an illegitimate intrusion into the legisla-
ture's role. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text for further discussion of Lochner.
8. Horwitz, supra note 6, at 599-602.
9. Id. at 602-03.
10. Id. at 604-10.
11. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 515, 522-24 (Black, J., concurring).
12. See infra notes 35-66 and accompanying text for further discussion of Griswold.
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Reproductive Services13 sharply criticizes the plurality for failing to justify the
judgment by addressing the underlying right to privacy. Thus, the privacy
cases from Griswold to Webster, like the equal protection cases from Brown to
Croson Co., remain highly controversial both within the Court and among the
general population.
If one interprets the liberal position on these cases as requiring a
commitment to either judicial restraint or judicial activism, then liberals seem
to face a binary choice. The court can either: (1) practice judicial restraint by
measuring statutes directly against explicit constitutional provisions, or (2)
resort to unrestrained judicial activism by substituting personal preference and
appeals to natural law or justice for the judgment of the legislature. On this
view, Lochner, Brown, and Griswold all exemplify judicial activism. Thus, if
one endorses judicial restraint, one rejects Lochner, Brown, and Griswold. On
the other hand, one who endorses judicial activism supports all three decisions.
Since the liberal must endorse either judicial restraint or judicial activism, and
reject the other, he cannot consistently reject Lochner but endorse Griswold
and Brown.
Horwitz attributes this simple dichotomy of activism versus restraint to
liberals, but he rejects it as misguided. He contends that a more satisfactory
analysis requires that one abandon the traditional liberal fiamework in favor of
an approach emphasizing social groups or classes. In this paper, I shall accept
the following claims advanced by the critics of liberalism: (1) liberals cannot
consistently reject Lochner but accept Brown and Griswold on the basis of a
categorical rejection or endorsement of judicial restraint or activism, and (2)
this dichotomy of restraint versus activism is misguided. I shall deny, however,
that accepting these claims creates any dilemma for liberalism. Rather, liberals
can consistently reject Lochner while endorsing Brown and Griswold on the
basis of a principled approach to judicial decisionmaking that remains
fundamentally liberal. Griswold reveals this approach more clearly than does
Brown. The roots of this approach are present in the dissenting opinions in
Plessy v. Ferguson4 and Lochner.
This article pursues two projects. First, it advances interpretations of
Griswold and of Brown and its immediate progeny, grounding these cases in
traditional liberal thought. s Second, it refutes the putative dilemma of liberal-
ism by describing a principled approach to constitutional interpretation that
allows liberals to support Griswold and Brown while rejecting Lochner. This
account of a principled foundation of Griswold and Brown and the approach to
constitutional interpretation that these cases reveal should prove useful to those
who continue to struggle with difficult issues such as those presented in Croson
Co. and Webster. It does not purport to provide easy answers to these cases,
however, because hard cases usually involve conflicts among principles or
13. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3072 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15. The term "immediate progeny" refers to the series of per curiam opinions that fol-
lowed shortly after Brown and struck down segregation in public facilities other than schools.
See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Holmes v. Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf courses); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (city
buses); New Orleans City Park Improvement Association v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(public parks). See infra text accompanying note 79.
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interests that require balancing and interpretation about which reasonable
people may honestly differ.
Neither does this article pretend to advance a new or comprehensive
theory of constitutional adjudication. Rather, it attempts to demonstrate that
both Griswold and Brown can be understood in the context of a principled
foundation that is consistent both with liberalism and with mainstream
approaches to constitutional interpretation. This approach illuminates the
ongoing issues represented by Croson Co. and Webster.
The argument proceeds in the following manner. Section II identifies the
apparent problem in a series of civil rights cases starting with Plessy and
culminating in Brown and its immediate progeny. Section III clarifies the con-
cept of liberalism, while section IV interprets Griswold as revealing a princi-
pled approach to constitutional decisionmaking that is consistent with liberal-
ism. Finally, sections V and VI demonstrate that this approach provides a
principled foundation for Brown and allows the liberal to consistently endorse
both Brown and Griswold while rejecting Lochner.
II. BROWN AND THE DILEMMA
Wechsler argues that legislative and judicial decisionmaking differ in that
a court's discretion is limited by the requirement that it support its ruling with
broad principles transcending the immediate result in generality and neu-
trality.16 He found Brown and its immediate progeny troubling because the
Court failed to provide such a principled explanation for this series of cases.
Wechsler noted that the Brown Court did not overrule the "separate but equal"
policy of Plessy, but rather held that in the specific area of public education,
separate is not equal. The Court then issued a series of per curiam opinions
apparently overruling Plessy without explanation. Wechsler concluded that
these opinions required a principled explanation justifying the decision to
overrule Plessy in principles of sufficient generality and neutrality.
Wechsler does not completely elucidate his conceptions of generality and
neutrality. When he calls for general principles, he apparently means reasons
applying to a broad class of cases rather than ones which address only the
instant case. By "neutrality" he apparently intends to preclude preferences
regarding a particular outcome in a particular case as an appropriate type of
reason for judicial decisionmaking.17 To satisfy Wechsler's requirements, then,
one would have to justify the Brown decision by appeal to broad principles that
extend beyond school desegregation cases and which do not depend on the belief
that schools ought to be desegregated.
The concerns raised by Brown and its immediate progeny go beyond the
lack of explicit explanation for overriding Plessy to the standard of review the
Court applied in Brown. In Lochner and other cases of that era, the Court
closely scrutinized both the ends and means of social and economic legislation. 18
Critics sharply criticized this practice as improper, contending that the Court
violated democratic principles by substituting its judgment for that of the
16. Wechsler, supra note 5, at 10-20.
17. Id. at 31-35.
18. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52-65. See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 436-40 (2d. ed. 1983) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
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democratically elected legislature.19 The Court repudiated such close scrutiny
well before the Brown decision, and continued to reject Lochnerism after
Brown. Eleven years after Brown Justice Douglas wrote, "[w]e do not sit as a
super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need and propriety of laws that
touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. '20 In Brown,
however, the Court subjected the social practice of segregation in public
education to careful scrutiny and overturned the legislation that supported it.2l
In summary, Brown and its immediate progeny raise two concerns for
those who support it. First, the Court discards the Plessy precedent without
explicitly overruling it or providing any principled explanation. Second, the
Court seemed to return to Lochnerism by subjecting social legislation to close
scrutiny. Thus, the Court might appear to some critics to have enacted its
preferences into law. In the eyes of a critic who makes such an interpretation,
liberals who support Brown face Horwitz's dilemma of liberalism. On this
interpretation, the Brown Court engaged in the practices that liberals criticized
in Lochner, and it did so without providing a principled explanation for distin-
guishing the two cases.
III. LIBERALISM
Horwitz gives no clear conception of liberalism, but he provides two
characteristics. Liberals support Brown but reject Lochner, and they prefer to
analyze issues from the perspective of the individual rather than in terms of
social classes or groups.22
John Stuart Mill articulated a principle of government that many people
accept as the classic statement of English liberalism. He asserted as an absolute
principle governing the relationship between the individual and the society:
[The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number is self-protection. . . . [T]he only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others....
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.
2 3
Joel Feinberg offers a contemporary formulation of liberalism in his cur-
rent work on the moral limits of the criminal law.24 Feinberg contends that
limitations on the individual liberty of competent adults require justification ac-
19. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 68-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 18, at 443-51.
20. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 18,
at 443-51.
21. See generally Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
22. Horwitz, supra note 6, at 599-607.
23. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68-69 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1974) (1859).
24. J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 14-15
(1984). Feinberg provides a brief definition of liberalism at this point. His larger project of pre-
senting and defending a liberal theory of the criminal law extends across the entire four-volume
work, and his conception of liberalism develops in all four. The other three volumes are:
OFFENSE TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW (1985), HARM TO SELF: THE
MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW (1986), and HARMLESS WRONGDOING: THE MORAL
LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW (1988).
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cording to liberty-limiting principles. He argues further that only the liberty-
limiting principles directed at preventing harm or serious offense to others jus-
tify state coercion through the criminal law. 25
Feinberg distinguishes among four senses of "autonomy" and focuses at-
tention on autonomy as a right to self-determination or personal sovereignty. 26
When a person possesses autonomy as a right, he has authority to choose for
himself over primarily self-regarding matters, especially central life decisions
regarding such issues as those involving person, privacy and property.27 In
Feinberg's view, self-determination and the actor's best interests usually corre-
spond, but when they do not, personal sovereignty takes priority. Government
may not interfere in voluntary, self-regarding choices by a competent person
for that person's own good because the value of autonomy is morally basic, not
derivative.28
Liberalism, as developed and refined by Feinberg, is the political theory
that vests a nonderivative value in autonomy as personal sovereignty and rec-
ognizes a presumption in favor of individual liberty that can be overridden only
to protect the legitimate interests of others.29 Clearly, the liberal cannot sup-
port the individual's liberty to do whatever he wants. Even the minimalist state
that forbids murder and theft limits liberty to an extent. A meaningful
statement of liberalism requires a relatively well-defined formulation of the
nature and scope of the individual liberty it advocates.
Ronald Dworkin has distinguished two senses of "liberty." The first is
liberty as license (libertyt), or the freedom to do what one pleases. The second
is liberty as independence (liberty,), or the status of the person as independent
and equal rather than subservient. While a right to libertyL protects specific
acts in which the actor may engage, liberty, is a more abstract concept
addressing a person's status as one who is capable of directing his own life
according to his own values.
All laws requiring or proscribing any acts at all limit, to some extent,
libertyL. Only laws that treat a person as incompetent or subservient limit his
liberty as independence. For example, zoning laws that prohibit a property
owner in a residential zone from running a commercial enterprise limit the
owner's libertyi to use his property as he wishes, but such laws do not limit
liberty1. Laws precluding persons of certain racial or ethnic groups from
residing in those residential zones, in contrast, would limit both their libertYL
and their liberty,. Such laws would prevent members of those groups from
doing as they wished in such a manner as to impute to them a subservient status
as citizens. Dworkin attributes this abstract concept of liberty, to Mill and
argues that such liberty is properly understood as a dimension of equality.
25. J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMrrS OF CRIMRNAL LAW 9-15
(1984).
26. J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LmITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 28-56
(1986).
27. Id. at 47-57.
28. Id. at 58-62.
29. This paper makes no attempt to provide a complete liberal theory. Such a task
would be well beyond the scope of this project. The account of liberalism presented here is only
intended to provide the minimal sketch required to pursue the central questions regarding the lib-
eral foundations of Brown and Griswold and the putative dilemma of liberalism.
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According to Dworkin, government recognizes the liberty, of its citizens when
it treats them with equal respect.30
Dworkin argues that governments must treat persons with equal concern
and respect.31 Respect is of particular significance here. To treat persons with
equal respect is to treat them as equally capable of forming and acting on
intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived. An individual's right
to equal respect is violated when his liberty, is limited on the grounds that his
conception of the good is less worthy than that of others, or when he is not
treated as an equal, that is, when his concerns and wishes are not accorded equal
weight with those of others in political decisions.
Dworkin identifies the right to be treated with equal concern and respect
as the liberal conception of equality.32 At this abstract level, the apparent
tension between liberty and equality dissolves. According to this liberal
conception of equality, citizens are equal in that they all share an equal right to
liberty. Conversely, all share liberty, insofar as they hold equal standing as
citizens, and any particular person's liberty, is limited when he is treated with
less than equal respecL 33 -
When the liberal conception of equality is understood in terms of liberty,
it gives rise to the less abstract right to liberty as independence; when it is
viewed in terms of equality, it generates the right to be treated as an equal.
Although the rights to liberty, and to treatment as an equal are less abstract than
the liberal conception of equality, they are more abstract than the specific
concrete rights to individual libertyL and to equal shares of societal benefits and
burdens that actual persons experience directly in their lives. Specific rights'to
certain libertiesL and to equal shares of certain societal benefits and burdens
give effective content to the more abstract rights to liberty, and to treatment as
an equal.
Dworkin denies, however, that these abstract rights require libertyL with
respect to all actions or absolute equality in all spheres of life. Rather, he
argues that the liberal is committed to equal treatment regarding specific
societal benefits and burdens, as well as to specific libertiesL, only when the
liberal conception of equality requires such treatment and libertiesL.34 That is,
the liberal conception of equality provides the fundamental principle that
grounds specific concrete rights and libertiesL.
Interpreted collectively, Mill, Feinberg and Dworkin reveal a picture of
liberalism as a political theory that vests a nonderivative value in the autonomy
of the individual. This fundamental value for personal sovereignty gives rise to
individual rights at three levels of abstraction. At the most abstract level, the
liberal conception of equality requires that government treat its citizens with
equal concern and respect. Government meets this responsibility by recogniz-
ing the somewhat less abstract rights to liberty as independence and to treatment
as an equal. Finally, at the least abstract level, there are rights to specific
30. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 262-63 (1977).
31. Id. at 272-74.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 273.
34. Id. at 272-74.
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libertiesL and to equal treatment regarding societal resources, that are required
to give effect to the more abstract rights.
Do liberals, such as Mill, Feinberg and Dworkin, face the dilemma that
Horwitz attributes to them, or can one identify a principled approach to consti-
tutional decisionmaking that is consistent with this conception of liberalism and
will allow liberals to accept Brown but reject Lochner? The brevity of the
Brown opinion and the per curiam opinions that followed render difficult the
task of analyzing the underlying reasoning of these cases. The next section of
this paper will interpret the Griswold opinion in order to identify an approach
to constitutional analysis that is consistent with liberalism.
IV. GRISWOLD AND LIBERALISM
The dispute between the majority and the dissenting opinions in Griswold
involves both the existence of the controversial right to privacy and the form of
review the court performed. Justice Douglas, in his majority opinion, found
that the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments create zones of privacy into
which the government cannot intrude. Furthermore, he concluded that
decisions regarding contraception in the marital relationship fall within the
scope of these zones of privacy. 35 The dissenting opinions reasoned that no
constitutional provision grants a right to privacy, and further, that the major-
ity's arguments based on the ninth amendment and such concepts as
"fundamental liberties" or "traditions and collective conscience" allow judges to
rule on the basis of personal preferences or appeals to natural law. The dissent
asserted that this reasoning marked a return to Lochnerism. 36
One alternative interpretation, however, is that the majority recognized a
right to privacy justified by a broad underlying right to libertyI. These rights
to privacy and liberty are revealed by a principled approach to constitutional
interpretation .that is consistent with liberalism, but does not revert to
Lochnerism. This paper does not assert that the Griswold majority explicitly
articulated this approach, or that it is the only accurate interpretation of the
opinion. Rather, this analysis demonstrates that there is at least one principled
foundation for the Griswold decision that the liberal can endorse without
returning to Lochnerism.
The dispute between the majority and the dissent regarding the sub-
stantive right to privacy appears to be somewhat confounded by the failure to
distinguish two senses of "privacy." Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion,
contrasts having one's property seized privately by stealth with having it seized
openly.3 7 He apparently understands "privacy" in the sense of "[a]bsence or
avoidance of publicity or display; a condition approaching to secrecy or
concealment." 38
While this is one correct use of the term "privacy," there is also a sense
in which private matters are "[w]ithdrawnor separated from the public body...
35. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-86.
36. Id. at 507-31 (Black, J., and Stewart, J., dissenting). For the sake of brevity, I
will refer to the dissenting opinions of Black and Stewart collectively as the dissent. Similarly, I
will refer to the opinions of Douglas, Goldberg, Harlan, and White collectively as the majority.
37. Id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting).
38. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1388 (1978).
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[o]f, pertaining, or relating to, or affecting a person, or a small intimate body
or group of persons apart from the general community; individual, personal." 39
A personal matter is one which is "[o]f, pertaining to, concerning, or affecting
the individual person or self (as opposed, variously, to other persons, the
general community.. .)."40 In this sense, a private matter is one that affects the
individual and has no effect (or at least no direct, substantial effect) on others.
Thus, a private matter is one that is appropriately removed from the public
concern or control, and left to the discretion of that individual. This second
interpretation of privacy emphasizes personal control rather than secrecy or
lack of publicity. A zone of privacy in this sense is a sphere of personal
sovereignty, within which the individual is free from government intrusion.
The reasoning of the majority is consistent with the second notion of
"privacy." Douglas described zones of privacy surrounding the first, third,
fourth and fifth amendments. The first protects freedom to associate, to attend
meetings, and to express attitudes by association or membership. The third
protects the individual's right to control his own home by refusing to quarter
soldiers in it. The fourth secures the individual's control of his person, home,
papers, and effects by protecting him from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment protects the individual's
control of his own testimony.' All four of these zones of privacy identified by
Douglas protect more than mere secrecy; they provide the individual with a
sphere of personal control from which he may exclude government intrusion.
This interpretation of privacy as a sphere of personal control beyond the
reach of government intervention is also evident in the concurring opinions.
Justice Goldberg described the right to privacy as the right, as against the
government, to be let alone.42 Justice White included in the right to privacy a
series of personal decisions regarding family life into which the state cannot
enter.43
The majority opinions emphasize that the right to privacy, as opposed to
a right to secrecy, is a right to exclusive personal control over certain areas of
life. The boundaries of this sphere of personal control are not clearly delin-
eated, but they are at least broad enough to include central family decisions
regarding marriage, contraception, and the rearing and education of children.
This right to a sphere of personal control calls to mind the liberal value of per-
sonal autonomy.
Feinberg's conception of liberalism would recognize a sphere of personal
sovereignty encompassing at least those central life decisions that do not
adversely affect the legitimate interests of others.44 Dworkin developed this
theme in terms of the liberal conception of equality that gives rise to the
abstract right to liberty as independence, and he argued that this broad general
39. Id. at 1388-89.
40. Id. at 726.
41. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
42. Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927)).
43. Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
44. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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right includes the right to those specific libertiesL that are required to give the
general right effect.45
On this interpretation, the Griswold majority gave content to the liberal
ideal of respect for personal autonomy by identifying the broad underlying
right of a person to be treated as independent and equal. The Court articulated
this right as a right to privacy.4 This right to privacy (like Dworkin's right to
liberty) is not a concrete right to specific freedoms or benefits. Rather, it is a
right to be treated with respect as an independent, equal person who can direct
his own life through autonomous choice. This broad general right is given
effect by recognizing specific zones of privacy within which the individual is
allowed to decide for himself. In short, the right to privacy can be understood
as analogous to Dworkin's right to liberty,, while the individual zones of
privacy the Court identified protect those specific libertiesL that are necessary
to give effect to the general underlying right to liberty.
There is no indication in Griswold that the Court identified a right to pri-
vacy broad enough to cover all primarily self-regarding decisions, as Mill and
Feinberg advocate. Indeed, subsequent decisions have made it clear that the
right recognized by the Court is not that broad.47 The Griswold Court made no
attempt to define the contours of this right to privacy except to include within it
the right to make one's own decisions regarding contraception in the marital
relationship.
While this interpretation of the right to privacy grounds the right in lib-
eral political theory, it does not address the dissent's objections regarding the
form of Court review. Justice Black argued in his dissent that no provision of
the Constitution explicitly grants such a right to privacy. He criticized the
majority's arguments justifying the right to privacy by reference to the ninth
amendment, "fundamental liberties," and "traditions and collective conscience"
because he asserts that these arguments allow individual judges to rule on the
basis of personal preferences or appeals to natural law. Justice Black views
Griswold, therefore, as a return to Lochnerism in that the Court substitutes its
own judgment regarding social and economic issues for that of the legislature 48
Black's objection to the reasoning of the Griswold majority presents liberals
with an alleged dilemma defined by the Lochner and Griswold decisions that is
analogous to the dilemma identified by Horwitz in terms of the Lochner and
Brown decisions.
The dissenting opinions in Griswold approached constitutional interpre-
tation in a fundamentally different manner than the majority opinions. The dis-
sent interpreted the constitutional provisions serially, while the majority inter-
preted the Constitution, or at least the Bill of Rights, as an integrated document.
45. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
46. I am not endorsing the majority's conception of privacy as that which best repre-
sents the common usage of the term. It is probably unfortunate that the majority chose the term
"privacy," rather than a term such as "personal sovereignty" or "self- determination," for the
right they articulated in this case. Such alternative phrases might have avoided some confusion.
It is important to recognize, however, that the nature of "privacy" as that term is used by the
majority differs from the understanding of it that the dissent seems to have.
47. J. FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 87-94. Feinberg reviews later privacy cases that
draw the boundaries of the constitutional right to privacy more narrowly than the Millian princi-
ple would call for.
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The dissenting opinions argued that no particular provision in the Constitution
grants a right to privacy.49 The majority, however, did not claim to find this
right in any individual provision. Rather, they supported their opinions with
broader Constitutional principles underlying the entire document or a series of
related provisions.
On first reading, Douglas' opinion seems to identify several different
rights to privacy which occur in the penumbras of different amendments:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.... The Ninth Amendment provides: '[t]he enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.'... The present case,
then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. 50
On one reading, these passages suggest that each of several specific provisions
independently creates a penumbral right to privacy that is ancillary to that
specific guarantee.
An alternative reading, however, would cast the right to privacy articu-
lated by Douglas as a broad, abstract right underlying several specific consti-
tutional provisions and providing those specific guarantees with a common
foundation in principle. This abstract right to privacy calls to mind the abstract
right to liberty, described above s' insofar as it defines a conception of the
proper relationship between the individual and the government. This abstract
right to privacy, like the right to liberty,, calls for a sphere of personal control
within which the individual exercises sovereignty. The abstract right to liberty,
requires certain specific libertiesk to give it effect.
Similarly, when Douglas enumerated several specific zones of privacy
into which the government may not intrude, he identified specific constitutional
guarantees that give effect to the broader, more abstract right to privacy
revealed by the Constitution as an integrated whole. That is, Douglas inter-
preted the Bill of Rights as protecting a broad underlying right to privacy that
is closely analogous to, if not interchangeable with, libertyi. That broad
abstract right is manifested by the protection of individual sovereignty provided
by the first eight amendments, and it requires the additional libertyL to make
one's own decisions regarding marital and family issues, including the decision
to buy and use contraception.
When the Constitution is approached in this manner, explicit constitu-
tional guarantees serve two purposes. First, they protect specific concrete
rights, and second, they provide evidence from which the Court can infer the
underlying political principles regarding the proper relation between the indi-
vidual and the state that are contemplated by the Constitution. The ninth and
48. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511-24 (Black, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 508, 510, 520-21 (Black, J., dissenting), 528, 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 484-85.
51. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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fourteenth amendments, then, allow the Court to protect additional specific
rights that are necessary to give effect to those underlying principles.
Douglas describes the right to privacy as "older than our Bill of
Rights."52 Some critics might understand this phrase as an attempt to ground
the right in natural law. On the interpretation suggested here, however, the
phrase is an appeal to the underlying principles of the Constitution. These
principles are older than the Constitution, but they are not beyond it. Rather,
they are the principles of political philosophy that are embodied in the
Constitution. The founding fathers did not create a Constitution from whole
cloth. Rather, they included in it the principles of political philosophy and the
structure of government that they were familiar with and endorsed. Thus, most
of the ideas included in the Constitution predated it, but they became part of it
when the Constitution was written and adopted.
On this view of constitutional analysis, Griswold is not a return to the
repudiated Lochnerism because the Court is not free to enact its preferences
into law, or to substitute its judgment about social and economic matters for
that of the legislature. The Court is charged with the task of identifying the
principles embodied in the Constitution, and protecting the specific libertiesL
implied by those principles. Reasonable people may differ regarding which
rights are so implied, but they must do so by presenting a coherent interpreta-
tion of the integrated document that supports their position. One can then
evaluate these competing interpretations by analyzing their ability to accom-
modate the entire document and those cases that are widely accepted as clear
cases.53
The approach to constitutional analysis attributed here to Douglas is
consistent with the concurring opinions. Justice Goldberg reasoned that the
fifth and fourteenth amendments protect fundamental rights from infringement
by the federal or state governments, and that the ninth amendment provides for
fundamental rights that are not listed in the first eight. He specifically rejected
personal preference or private notions as appropriate criteria for identifying
fundamental rights. Fundamental rights are those which are rooted in the
52. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
53. Justice Black's dissent in Griswold contended that the majority in that case returned
to Lochner in that they claimed the authority to overrule legislative action on the basis of their
personal preferences or appeals to natural law. 381 U.S. at 507-27. See also supra notes 11-
12, 36 and accompanying text. The interpretation presented here demonstrates that the majority
position does not claim this authority. Rather, it contends that justices ought to pursue an inte-
grated interpretation of the Constitution and interpret the specific provisions in light of the under-
lying political philosophy derived from the integrated interpretation.
There is no reason to assume that this response would bring Justice Black into harmo-
nious agreement with the majority. He might object, for example, that the integrated approach
tends to produce Constitutional theories that are too abstract to sufficiently constrain the latitude
of individual judges. That contention, however, raises a separate issue regarding the relative
merits of the serial and integrated approaches. It does not support Justice Black's actual claims
regarding personal preferences or natural law, and it does not support the putative dilemma of
liberalism. Rather, this contention asserts a position in the ongoing debate regarding competing
models of Constitutional interpretation. An interesting formulation of this criticism would pre-
sent some principled argument purporting to show that the serial approach, or some alternative,
provides more effective constraint on judicial latitude while fulfilling the other requirements of an
acceptable method of Constitutional adjudication. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text
for further discussion of various issues that critics might want to join with the theses advanced in
this article.
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"traditions and [collective] conscience of our people."u In his dissent, Justice
Black questioned the availability of scientific methods of ascertaining which
rights are so rooted.55 Justice Goldberg, however, did not describe a scientific
enterprise; rather, he inferred the fundamental nature of the rights in question
from "[t]he entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly
underlie its specific guarantees. 56
The Douglas and Goldberg analyses suggest that the Court should
interpret the entire Constitution and its purposes in order to identify those fun-
damental rights which are necessary to give effect to the basic principles of
government it represents. This paper contends that both Justice Goldberg and
Justice Douglas concluded that the Constitution contemplates a relationship
between the individual and the state that reflects the basic principles of liberal-
ism. This relationship requires respect for liberty in the broad general sense of
the right to be treated as independent and equal. The specific guarantees of the
first eight amendments serve both to identify this broad underlying right and to
protect it. The ninth and fourteenth amendments serve to protect any additional
specific rights that are necessary to effectuate this underlying principle.
Justice Harlan adopted a similar pattern of analysis in his concurring
opinion. According to Justice Harlan, the fourteenth amendment protects the
"basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."57 Judicial restraint is
enforced by "respect for the teachings of history, [and] solid recognition of the
basic values that underlie our society."58 That is, the Court protects funda-
mental rights and enforces judicial restraint by interpreting the entire
Constitution in order to identify the basic values revealed by the structure of
our society as defined by the Constitution.
Justice Harlan's reference to "the concept of ordered liberty" as the
principle protected by the fourteenth amendment is consistent with Dworkin's
conception of liberty as independence. Dworkin argues that the broad abstract
right to liberty, implies those specific libertiesL that are necessary to give it
effect. 59 Similarly, Justice Harlan reasoned that the fourteenth amendment
provides those specific protections that are necessary to protect values implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty. Justice Harlan took exception with the
reasoning in Justice Douglas' opinion because he interpreted Justice Douglas as
asserting that the fourteenth amendment protects only those rights specifically
identified by the first eight amendments or their radiations. 60 On the
interpretation of Justice Douglas suggested above, however, both he and Justice
Harlan analyze the entire Constitution, including the first eight amendments, in
order to identify the basic principles of government that underlie it. Both
54. 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 501.
59. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
60. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499-500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Justices then extend protection to those specific rights implied by the underlying
principles. 61
Justice White's concurring opinion reveals a pattern of analysis consistent
with that of Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and Harlan. He concentrated
specifically on marital and family issues where he found that prior cases iden-
tified a "realm of family life which the state cannot enter."62 Clearly, Justice
White did not purport to find this language in any specific provision of the
Constitution. Rather, he described such rights regarding family life as among
"the basic civil rights of man."63
Some critics might interpret this claim as an appeal to natural law with-
out foundation in the Constitution. On the interpretation advanced here, how-
ever, Justice White appealed to the basic principles underlying the specific
guarantees in the Constitution when that document is interpreted as an inte-
grated whole. Like the other Justices in the majority, White found that the
broad general right to liberty as independence supports many specific
Constitutional guarantees, and he concluded that it implies a right to personal
sovereignty over marital and family decisions.
In summary, the Griswold majority and dissent differ regarding both the
substantive right to privacy and the acceptable form of Constitutional analysis.
The majority found a substantive right to privacy as a right to individual con-
trol of certain spheres of life without government interference. While the
scope of this right is not clear, it is at least broad enough to include decisions
about basic marital and family issues. The dissent apparently interpreted pri-
vacy as confidentiality rather than control, and it found no constitutional right
to privacy.
This substantive dispute reflects a corresponding formal dispute. The
dissent reviewed the provisions of the Constitution serially, finding no right to
privacy in any single provision, and therefore concluded that there is no such
right. The majority interpreted the Constitution as an integrated whole, identi-
fied broader underlying principles revealed by the entire text, and protected
both the specific guarantees explicit in the document and additional rights
required to give content to those principles. In this approach, explicit guaran-
tees, such as the first eight amendments, serve two purposes. First, they protect
specific libertiesL. Second, they provide grounds for inferring the underlying
principles of government embodied in the Constitution. These principles, in
tram, give rise to additional individual rights required to give them effect, and
the ninth amendment recognizes these additional rights as legitimate.
The majority's approach does not give the Court unbridled discretion to
appeal to personal preference or natural law. The majority's method of anal-
ysis constrains the Justices by a standard very similar to Dworkin's doctrine of
political responsibility. This doctrine limits political officials to those political
decisions that they can justify with a comprehensive political theory that will
61. Compare id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring) with supra notes 41-47 and
accompanying text. Both Douglas and Harlan can be understood as interpreting principles
underlying the entire Constitution, rather than separate provisions.
62. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
63. Id.
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also justify all other decisions that they propose to make.64 Dworkin applies
this doctrine to judicial decisionmaking by requiring that his mythical judge,
"Hercules," decide hard cases by applying the theory of political morality that
best justifies the entire system of law and political institutions in his jurisdic-
tion.65
The approach of the Griswold majority is less comprehensive than
Hercules' task in that it involves only an interpretation of the Constitution as an
integrated document, not a justification of the entire legal and political system.
It also differs from Dworkin's theory in that it does not assume that there is a
single correct theory that best explains the legal system. Individual justices can
interpret the Constitution as an integrated document without supposing that they
have formulated the single theory that best explains it. They are required,
however, to apply a consistent theory of the Constitution and to commit
themselves to applying that theory to all relevant cases. In this manner, the
constitutional theory of each justice provides the foundation in general and the
neutral principles required by Wechsler.66
Assuming that the right to privacy articulated by the Griswold majority
is consistent with liberalism and grounded in a principled approach to constitu-
tional analysis, does this interpretation of Griswold resolve the putative
dilemma of liberalism? The remaining sections of this paper will apply this
interpretation to Brown, and argue that Griswold and Brown are distinguish-
able from Lochner in a manner that enables the liberal to endorse Griswold and
Brown while rejecting Lochner.
V. RESOLVING THE DILEMMA
A. Foundations in the Plessy Dissent
Brown was the cornerstone of a series of civil-rights cases undermining
the rule of "separate but equal" promulgated by Plessy in 1896. Plessy upheld a
state statute requiring separate accommodations for the white and colored races
on railroad coaches. 67 The plaintiff challenged the statute under the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments. The Court quickly dismissed the thirteenth
amendment challenge, reasoning that this provision only abolishes slavery and
involuntary servitude.68
The Court asserted that the fourteenth amendment was intended to insure
legal equality for the recently emancipated slaves. According to the Court, the
purpose of the amendment was to protect black persons from special legal
burdens or disabilities that would infringe legal rights, but it was not intended
to insure social equality. The Court reasoned that laws requiring separate but
equal accommodations do not imply legal inferiority or impose special legal
64. R. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 87.
65. Id. at 81-130. I am not defending Dworkin's theory of adjudication as the ulti-
mately correct one. The point is that the formal approach attributed here to the Griswold major-
ity is consistent with at least one mainstream theory of adjudication which limits the discretion of
judges.
66. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
67. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537.
68. Id. at 542. The Court reasoned that these practices involved bondage, ownership,
or at least control over labor, none of which were present in this case.
1990] LIBERALISM 349
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
burdens, and it concluded that such laws are not contrary to the fourteenth
amendment.69
Justice Harlan dissented in a manner foreshadowing both the form and
the substance of Griswold. The majority applied the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments to the facts of the case sequentially. Justice Harlan, in contrast,
interpreted the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments as an integrated
set. He concluded that the collective purpose of these three post-Civil War
amendments was to secure all the civil rights of full citizenship for the recently
emancipated blacks. He reasoned that in order to accomplish this purpose, these
amendments must include a positive immunity from legislation implying
inferiority or decreasing their security in the enforcement of their rights.70
The difference between Justice Harlan's formal approach and the ma-
jority's is not that he rejected judicial restraint while the majority endorsed it.
Justice Harlan actually advocated a more stringent standard of judicial defer-
ence than did the majority. The majority applied a reasonableness standard to
the statute in question and concluded that this law constituted an exercise of the
state's police power that fell within the scope of the legislature's authority. 71
Justice Harlan rejected the reasonableness standard, reasoning that it is the
Court's responsibility to respect the legislative will, even if it is unreasonable,
providing that it is Constitutionally valid.n
The primary formal difference between the majority and Justice Harlan
was that the majority (like the Griswold dissent) applied each provision to the
facts serially, while Justice Harlan (like the Griswold majority) sought the pur-
pose underlying the integrated set of post-Civil War amendments. This formal
approach led Justice Harlan to conclude that these three provisions established a
right to equality before the law. He reasoned that this right required protection
from unfriendly legislation that would lessen the black citizen's security in
enforcement of his rights.73
As discussed previously, the liberal conception of equality gives rise to
less abstract rights to treatment as an equal and to libertyl.74 The substantive
right to equality before the law that Justice Harlan found in the post-Civil War
amendments is strikingly similar to the right to treatment as an equal.
Similarly, the Griswold majority found a right to privacy regarding marital
decisions about contraception. That right protects certain libertiesL which are
69. Id. at 542-48.
70. Id. at 555-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 550.
72. Id. at 558-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority and Harlan may not have used
the term 'reasonable" in the same sense. The majority opinion states that the Court can only ask
whether the statute constituted a reasonable regulation, and that the Court must grant broad dis-
cretion to the legislature on that question. Id. at 550-51. Harlan reasoned that the Court must
uphold the statute, even if it is unreasonable, providing that it is valid. He asserted that a statute
may be unreasonable merely because it is contrary to sound public policy.
If the majority construed "reasonable" in the same sense that Harlan did, then Harlan
called for more judicial restraint than did the majority. If, however, the majority intended
"reasonable" to be understood as requiring only that the statute pass the constitutional standard
of validity by manifesting some rational relation between the regulation and its purpose, then
Harlan and the majority apparently endorsed the same standard of judicial restraint. In neither
case, however, did Harlan advocate less judicial restraint than did the majority.
73. Id. at 555-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
74. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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necessary to give effect to the abstract right to liberty,. In short, both the
Griswold majority and Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent adopted the integrated
formal approach to constitutional adjudication, and both articulated substantive
rights consistent with the view that the liberal conception of equality underlies
the Constitution.75
B. The Liberal Foundation for Brown
The Plessy "separate but equal" doctrine remained in force for approx-
imately sixty years until a series of Supreme Court cases, including Brown,
effectively overruled Plessy. In the earlier cases in this series, the Court ruled
that separate graduate programs for blacks failed under the Plessy standard
because they lacked the tangible or intangible resources of the corresponding
programs for white students.76 These cases did not directly threaten the Plessy
rule because the separate facilities were not equal.
Brown was pivotal because, for the first time, the Court confronted a
case in which the lower courts had found that the separate systems were equal
or in the process of becoming equal. The Court directly addressed the status of
segregation in public education. It concluded that segregation in public educa-
tion is inherently unequal, and therefore violates the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The decision did not overtly overrule Plessy, but it
did explicitly reject any language in Plessy that would be inconsistent with the
finding that segregation in public education adversely affects black children."
The unanimous opinion of the Court discussed very little legal doctrine,
concentrating instead on the importance of education and on the adverse effects
of segregation on black children. The Court reasoned that education is central
to an individual's capacity to fulfill his responsibilities as a citizen and to his
ability to succeed in life. The opinion cited evidence to support the assertion
that segregation in education generates feelings of inferiority on the part of
minority children as to their status in the community, adversely affecting them
in a manner that is likely to be permanent. It reasoned that segregation would
impair these children's motivation to learn, and thus, their educational and
mental development. The Court concluded that segregation in education, even
in equal facilities, deprives minority children of equal educational opportunity,
and therefore violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.78
The holding in Brown is relatively narrow in that it prohibits segregation
only in public education, and arguably in other social institutions that are im-
portant to the citizen's capacity to fulfill his duty as a citizen and to succeed in
life. Brown's immediate progeny, however, struck down segregation regarding
public beaches, golf courses, buses, and parks.79 This entire series of cases
collectively abolished segregation in public facilities. Unfortunately, the
75. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text regarding the liberal conception of
equality.
76. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Oklahoma,
332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
77. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-95.
78. Id. at 493-95.
79. See cases cited supra note 15.
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principled justification for this result is unclear due to the specific focus of the
Brown opinion on the harmful effects of segregated education and the per
curiam nature of the opinions that followed Brown.
This series of civil rights cases, when viewed in sequence, suggests a
progression toward a principled foundation that is consistent with Justice
Harlan's Plessy dissent and with the liberal conception of equality. The early
graduate education cases held that separate is not equal in public education when
the tangible or intangible factors that weigh heavily in the value of graduate
education are not equal.80 Brown held that separate cannot be equal when the
process of segregation implies inferior status regarding a resource of central
importance in the society. The cases immediately following Brown extended
the holding to virtually any community resource. If these cases also represent
an extension of the Brown rationale, then Brown and its progeny stand for the
proposition that segregation violates a right protected by the fourteenth
amendment whenever it implies inferior status regarding any public resource.
The focus in this progression of cases gradually shifts from the practical
value of the resource to the imputation of inferior status to the minority group.
That is, Brown and its immediate progeny stand for the proposition that racial
segregation involving any public resource is unconstitutional because it imputes
an inferior status as citizens to the members of the minority group. Even if the
separate facilities were equal in their tangible qualities, legally enforced
separation would relegate the minority groups to a position of lesser standing.
This emphasis on the minority group members' right to be treated as equals
calls to mind the liberal conception of equality.
The liberal conception of equality generates the less abstract rights to be
treated as an equal and to liberty as independence.81 The abstract right to
liberty, implies the right to those specific libertiesL that are necessary to give it
effect. The Griswold majority held that the fourteenth amendment protects the
individual's right to make decisions regarding contraception in the marital
relationship despite the fact that no specific provision identifies such a right.
On the interpretation advanced here, the Court implied this specific right in
order to give content to the abstract right to liberty, that emerged when the
Court interpreted the Constitution as an integrated Whole.82
Similarly, the abstract right to be treated as an equal requires equal
shares of social resources in those matters in which such concrete equality is
necessary to render effective one's status as a citizen equal to that of others.83
According to the analysis advanced in section (V)(A), Justice Harlan's dissent in
Plessy exemplified a pattern analogous to that of the Griswold majority. Justice
80. See cases cited supra note 76.
81. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 35-66 and accompanying text. Some might argue that no single
libertyLis literally necessary for liberty in the strong sense that a person could not posses liberty,
without that particular libertyL, regardless of what other libertiesL he had. Others might argue that
certain libertiesL are necessary to liberty in this strong sense. This paper takes no position on
this question. It is sufficient for the purpose of this paper to interpret "necessary" in the weaker
sense in which the Court has previously interpreted it. "To employ the means necessary to an
end, is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as
being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-14 (1819).
83. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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Harlan interpreted the post-Civil War amendments as an integrated set, and he
concluded that their purpose was to establish equal status as citizens for the
black minority. He derived a right to equal treatment in public accommodations
as necessary to protect this broader right to equal status.84
Although Brown and its immediate progeny do not provide a detailed
foundation in general principles, the approach to interpretation attributed above
to the Griswold majority and the Plessy dissent would also apply to Brown.
Had the Brown Court interpreted the entire Constitution as embodying the lib-
eral conception of equality as one of its underlying principles, and the four-
teenth amendment as protecting any specific rights necessary to give effect to
those principles, it could reasonably have concluded that the equal protection
clause implied a right not to be subjected to segregation that would suggest
inferior status in relation to any public resource. The claim here is not that the
Brown Court actually articulated such a rationale; it did not. Rather, the point
is that such an approach would provide a coherent foundation in the liberal
conception of equality for Brown and its immediate progeny, and it would
provide the foundation in principles of sufficient generality and neutrality as
required by Wechsler.85
In summary, the Griswold majority and the Plessy dissent exemplify the
following approach to adjudication, and this approach also provides a plausible
foundation for Brown. In each case, the Justices analyzed the specific guaran-
tees in the Constitution (or a series of relevant provisions) in order to derive
broad underlying principles that provide a common foundation for these provi-
sions. They understood the fourteenth amendment as protecting the specific
rights necessary to give effect to the fundamental principles embodied in the
Constitution. Thus the individual provisions serve both to protect specific lib-
erties and to reveal the underlying principles, which, in turn, provide the foun-
dation for additional specific rights.
In these three cases, the Justices derived the liberal conception of
equality, or some aspect of it, as a broad principle underlying the Constitution.
In Griswold, the Court found the abstract right to liberty as independence
underlying the Constitution. The Court articulated this abstract right as a right
to privacy, and concluded that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protected the specific libertYL to decide for oneself whether to
purchase and use contraception in the marital relationship as an implied corre-
late of this abstract right to libertyI. In the Plessy dissent, as well as in Brown
and its immediate progeny, the justices derived the right to treatment as an
equal from the specific guarantees. They then concluded that the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment protected the specific right to be
free of segregation that implies inferior status.
This construction of these three cases provides the liberal with a consis-
tent, principled foundation for all three opinions. Does it do so, however,
without falling prey to the dilemma of liberalism asserted by Horwitz and
Justice Black? Specifically, does this analysis of Griswold and Brown commit
the liberal to endorsing Lochner?
84. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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The Lochner Court overturned a New York statute limiting bakers to a
sixty-hour work week. In doing so, the Court reasoned that its role was to
review police power regulations in order to determine whether they constituted
a fair and reasonable exercise of the police power or an unnecessary and
arbitrary intrusion into the liberty of the individual. The Court referred to a
general right to liberty as well as to the right to enter into contracts and sell
one's labor as an aspect of that general liberty.86 The Court did not make a
distinction between liberty as independence and liberty as license. Rather, it
asserted its responsibility to review any legislation that limited liberty in gen-
eral in order to determine whether it constituted a legitimate police power
regulation.
This general liberty is not the equivalent of liberty as independence,
which is an abstraction that must be given content through the enforcement of
certain specific libertiesL. It appears to be a general form of libertyL; that is, a
broad right to do what one wants. Such a general liberty would be limited by
virtually any law. According to the majority view, therefore, the Court would
have the duty to closely scrutinize the reasonableness of virtually any legisla-
tion.
The Court recognized the legitimacy of statutory regulation in the inter-
est of the public health, safety, welfare, or morals. Although the majority
denied that it substituted its own judgment for that of the legislature, it
reviewed possible arguments in support of the challenged statute as a reasonable
health or welfare regulation and found them wanting. The majority concluded
that the statute constituted an unwarranted intrusion into individual liberty
rather than a legitimate exercise of police power.87
Both dissenting opinions, in contrast, distinguished fundamental liberties
from the general category of liberty. Justice Holmes explicitly rejected the idea
of a general liberty to do whatever one wants. He reasoned that the fourteenth
amendment prohibits only legislation that would "infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our
law."8
Justice Harlan wrote that the state may not interfere with the citizen's
right to "enter into contracts that may be necessary and essential in the
enjoyment of the inherent rights belonging to everyone .... 8 9 He included,
among these inherent rights, the rights to use one's faculties in all lawful ways
and to earn one's livelihood by any lawful calling.90 He reasoned, however,
that the legislature may regulate liberty of contract, and that the court may not
invalidate such regulation unless it is "beyond question, plainly and palpably in
excess of legislative power."9'
These dissenting opinions did not describe a detailed approach to adjudi-
cation such as the one attributed in this paper to the Griswold majority, the
Plessy dissent, and Brown and its immediate progeny. These opinions at-
86. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53-56.
87. Id. at 57-62.
88. Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id. at68.
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tempted to identify fundamental principles and inherent rights, however, and
they reasoned that the Constitution protects these principles and rights rather
than a general liberty to do as one wishes. The majority, however, treated any
legislative limitation of general individual liberty as subject to Court review for
reasonableness. Since most, if not all, social legislation would have some effect
on the general liberty of the individual, the Court was asserting its duty to
review virtually all social legislation in order to evaluate the reasonableness of
the legislature's judgment.
Had the Lochner Court adopted the approach attributed in this paper to
the Griswold and Brown Courts, it would have interpreted the Constitution as
an integrated whole in order to identify the underlying principles of political
philosophy that best support the entire document. Reasonable people will differ
regarding which principles best support the Constitution. The liberal would
argue, however, that the broad principles underlying the Constitution include
the liberal conception of equality and, hence, the less abstract rights to liberty,
and to treatment as an equal. On this interpretation, the Court would ask
whether the regulations at issue in Lochner violated a libertyL that is required
to give effect to liberty,.
The abstract right to liberty, addresses the individual's status as an
independent person who is capable of directing his own life according to his
own values. Laws that treat the individual as incompetent or subservient violate
this right.92 Laws that prohibit individuals from working, or from pursuing an
occupation for which they are otherwise qualified, would reasonably be
interpreted as a deprivation of a libertyL that infringes on libertyi. Therefore,
the Court would subject such laws to close scrutiny. Thus, the liberal would
support close scrutiny of the regulations at issue in Lochner only if the libertyL
to work as a baker for more than sixty hours a week is necessary to give
content to libertyi.
The liberal would argue that the libertyL limited by the regulations at
issue in Lochner is not required to give effect to the individual's abstract right
to liberty, and therefore, that the Court should not subject these regulations to
close scrutiny. The liberal would contend that this distinguishes Lochner from
Griswold and Brown, both of which protect rights required by the liberal con-
ception of equality underlying the Constitution. Griswold protects the libertyL
to make one's own decisions regarding contraception and family planning
which is a central aspect of an individual's life-plan and, thus, of liberty.
Similarly, Brown protects each person's right to equal treatment regarding
social resources, thus supporting each individual's claim to treatment as a citi-
zen with equal status.
Some critics might argue that regulations preventing bakers from work-
ing more than sixty hours a week violate a libertyL that is necessary to give
effect to liberty,. This argument could take two forms: first, the critic could
contend that limitation of any libertyL violates liberty,, or second, he could
claim that this specific libertyL is necessary to give content to liberty. The
former strategy encounters the problems of defending a general liberty to do
92. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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whatever one wants; such general liberty is limited by virtually any law,
including those that proscribe murder or theft.
The second strategy seems more plausible, but it requires substantive
argument to show that the right to work as a baker for more than sixty hours a
week is necessary to one's status as an independent person who is competent to
run his own life according to his own values. Perhaps the most plausible
variation on this claim would assert that a law preventing one from working
more than sixty hours a week as a baker arbitrarily limits one's right to
contract for his own labor, and that this right to determine how one will use his
own labor is a libertyL required by liberty.
Many liberals would agree that the right to determine how one will use
his own labor is essential to liberty. Liberals in the tradition of Mill or
Feinberg defend the individual's right to libertYL in all essentially self-
regarding decisions. Liberals limit this contention, however, to fully voluntary
choices. The liberal defense of liberty, reflects the liberal value of autonomy.
Only voluntary choices involve the individual's autonomy, and therefore,
liberty, demands respect only for voluntary, self-regarding decisions.93
Such liberals would argue that the contracts proscribed by the regulations
in dispute in Lochner either were not self-regarding, or were not voluntary. If
the regulations were intended to maintain the purity of the bread, and thus
protect the public health, by preventing bakers from working beyond the point
of fatigue, then the proscribed contracts were not entirely self-regarding
because they would have increased the danger to others. Ideally, such an
argument would cite some evidence that bakers who worked beyond sixty hours
a week tended to make more errors as they became fatigued. Regulations
limiting libertyL in order to avoid acts that raise a serious risk of harm to
others do not infringe on liberty,, and hence the liberal can endorse them.
Alternatively, the regulations may have been motivated by the belief that
the proscribed contracts were not voluntary because the individual baker was
negotiating under coercive circumstances. If the conditions in the industry
were such that the individual had to work as many hours as the employer
demanded in order to maintain employment, then the decision to work more
than sixty hours a week was coerced, and the regulations limited the effect of
this coercion. If the regulations limited the effect of coercion rather than a
fully voluntary choice, it did not infringe liberty,.
In summary, if the regulations were intended either to protect the public
from contaminated products or to protect the baker from coercive conditions,
then these laws were not an arbitrary limitation of the individual's right to
determine how he would use his own labor and, therefore, were not a violation
of libertyi. In either case, the critic's argument fails. The liberal can reject
Lochner because the regulations overturned in that case did not violate libertyx.
The regulations constrained individual decisions that were not self-regarding or
not fully voluntary. The liberal would argue that the Court should not have
subjected these regulations to close scrutiny because the libertyL that was limited
93. Feinberg provides a detailed account of the role of voluntariness in the liberal
defense of individual autonomy. See generally J. FEINBERG, supra note 26.
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was not required by liberty. The Court should have accepted, therefore, any
reasonable rationale advanced by the legislature.
Suppose, however, that regulations such as those in dispute in Lochner
were advanced with absolutely no rationale, and that there was no plausible
foundation for them. Suppose, for example, that all parties agreed that work-
ing more than sixty hours a week created no health hazards for anyone, and that
bakers enjoyed a bargaining position such that they were completely free to
work as many or as few hours as they chose. In such a case the regulations
would constitute an arbitrary limitation of the individual's right to determine
how he would use his own labor, and these regulations would interfere with an
entirely voluntary, self-regarding choice. Had this been the case in Lochner,
then the liberal would be committed to endorsing the decision in Lochner. Had
these conditions actually obtained, however, endorsing Lochner would cause no
embarrassment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purposes of this paper have been to advance principled liberal justi-
fications for Griswold and Brown and to demonstrate that liberals are not faced
with a dilemma by their desire to reject Lochner while endorsing Griswold and
Brown. Neither of the latter decisions commits one to a return to Lochnerism.
One can advance a principled approach to constitutional adjudication that
interprets the Constitution as an integrated whole and supports the core of
liberalism. On this approach, the liberal conception of equality is a broad
underlying principle that one can derive from the Constitution as a whole. This
abstract principle generates less abstract rights to liberty as independence and to
treatment as an equal. At the most concrete level, there are rights to specific
libertiesL and to equal treatment regarding societal resources that are necessary
to give effect to the more abstract rights.
Specific constitutional guarantees serve both to protect certain libertiesL
and to identify the broader underlying principles. The fourteenth amendment
protects all specific rights that are implied by these fundamental principles.
The equal protection clause protects the right to equal treatment regarding
societal benefits and burdens when such treatment is required to give effect to
the abstract right to treatment as an equal. The due process clause protects
specific libertiesL that are necessary to give content to the abstract right to
libertyi.
Horwitz contends that liberals' concern for individuals prevents them
from addressing historical inequalities of condition that deprive the members of
certain classes of effective equality of opportunity.94 The liberal interpretation
of the Constitution described in this article, however, contends that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides for those concrete
protections necessary to give effect to the underlying right to treatment as an
equal. When members of a certain group suffer inequalities of condition that
prevent effective exercise of the more abstract rights, liberalism not only
allows the court to address the actual conditions of inequality, it requires the
corrective action needed to give effect to those abstract rights.
94. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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This interpretation is consistent with at least some judicially approved
affirmative action programs. These programs provide certain advantages to
members of minority groups because previous discrimination created inequality
of condition which currently precludes effective equality of opportunity. 95
Cases such as Croson Co.96 remain hard cases, but this interpretation suggests a
principled framework within which these controversial programs can be
evaluated. In each case, the Court must ask whether members of the dis-
advantaged group suffer such inequality of condition as to prevent them from
exercising the abstract right to be treated as an equal. If the answer is yes, then
the Court can justifiably intervene in order to render that abstract right
effective. Affirmative action plans that provide certain advantages to the dis-
advantaged groups without undermining the right of others to be treated as
equals would constitute one plausible way to achieve this goal.
The most problematic cases are those in which the only efficacious
method of vindicating the disadvantaged group's right to be treated as equals
disadvantages members of other groups in a manner that undermines their right
to be treated as equals. In such a situation, adopting the program in question
will violate one party's right to be treated as an equal, while rejecting it will
allow the corresponding right for the other party to remain unrealized. Thus,
neither option will be fully satisfactory.
Unfortunately, courts sometimes encounter circumstances in which they
must chose between two unjust results, and some innocent party must suffer.
Sometimes, courts are forced to compare unfair outcomes and to attempt to
craft remedies that minimize the severity or duration of injustice. In these
cases, courts interpreting the Constitution in the manner advocated in this
article would attempt to balance the relative infringements of the abstract right
to treatment as equals for each party. These courts would devise a plan
intended to maximize effective realization of that right for all. They would
recognize, however, that at least one party, and possibly both, would suffer
some injustice as a result.
In short, some cases remain hard cases because they require decisions
under circumstances in which no course of action is fully fair to all parties. In
these cases, all approaches to constitutional adjudication and all substantive
political theories, including liberalism, will fail to fully satisfy either the parties
or our ideal principles of justice. Contrary to Horwitz's claim, however, the
liberal approach to constitutional interpretation described in this paper can take
historical inequalities of condition into account when such factors prevent the
members of disadvantaged groups from effectively exercising the underlying
abstract rights.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) and Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Both cases upheld affirmative action plans designed to com-
pensate for historical patterns of discrimination which had resulted in actual conditions preclud-
ing effective equality of opportunity.).
96. 488 U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989). See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
The Court affirmed a ruling by the court of appeals that overturned Richmond's affirmative
action plan requiring that contractors sub-contract at least thirty percent of awarded city contracts
to "minority business enterprises." The Court found that the plan lacked the evidence of prior
discrimination required to establish a compelling state interest and that the plan was not narrowly
tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose.
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Just as Croson Co. addresses problematic issues derived from Brown and
the jurisprudence of equal protection, Webster involves controversial state
regulation of a libertYL that creates tension in the law of due process derived
from Griswold, the right to privacy and liberty1. As with equal protection, this
analysis provides a principled framework within which these issues can be
addressed, although it does not supply quick and easy answers. It may, how-
ever, provide some assistance in containing the debate within the bounds set by
Wechsler's requirement of principled justification.
This paper does not argue that this is the approach that the Court always
uses, or that it is the ultimately correct theory of adjudication. Rather, the
point is to demonstrate that there is at least one plausible interpretation of the
foundations of pivotal cases such as Griswold and Brown on which the liberal
can avoid the putative dilemma of liberalism. Recall that critics such as
Horwitz and Justice Black contend that this dilemma arises because liberals
reject judicial activism in Lochner but support it in Brown and Griswold.97
This article offers a defense of Brown and Griswold that does not
commit liberals to endorsing either Lochner or any categorical position regard-
ing judicial activism. This defense involves both a methodological thesis and a
substantive one. Methodologically, it endorses the integrated approach to
constitutional interpretation rather than the serial one. Substantively, it
advances a conception of liberalism that identifies individual rights at three
levels of abstraction, and it contends that the Brown and Griswold majority
opinions are consistent with an interpretation of the Constitution as a document
embodying this conception of liberalism.
While this article rejects the putative dilemma of liberalism, it does not
purport to resolve the ongoing debates regarding constitutional adjudication in
general or fourteenth amendment jurisprudence in particular. The method-
ological thesis demonstrates that the opinions generally supported by liberals98
take the integrated formal approach rather than the serial one. Critics might
attack the methodological thesis by demonstrating that liberals could not
consistently endorse the integrated approach or by showing that this approach is
problematic in other ways. Mere assertions that the Brown and Griswold
majorities "really" just enacted their preferences into law, however, do not
constitute serious criticism. An interesting attack on the methodological thesis
might take the form, for example, of an argument supporting the contention
that some available alternative approach would provide a more satisfactory
constraint on judicial latitude while fulfilling the other requirements of a
principled approach to Constitutional adjudication.
Alternately, critics might accept the methodological thesis but contest the
substantive one. They might contend that the Constitution represents some
political theory other than liberalism more accurately than it does liberalism.
Still other critics might argue that the Constitution embodies a different
formulation of liberalism than the one advanced here or that the Brown and
Griswold opinion are not consistent with a more fully articulated conception of
liberalism.
97. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
98. That is, the majority opinions in Brown and Griswold and the dissenting opinions
in Plessy and Lochner.
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Many plausible criticisms of Brown, Griswold, liberalism, and the inte-
grated approach to constitutional adjudication remain. In this article I have
tried to demonstrate, however, that profitable pursuit of these issues cannot take
the form of the putative dilemma of liberalism or of assertions that these Courts
were "really" enacting their personal preferences into law. Rather, helpful
discussion requires careful analysis of the political philosophy embodied in the
Constitution and examination of competing models of constitutional ad-
judication in light of that political philosophy.
